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:Pretrial Discovery-UsE oF
tional Harvester Co.

A PARTY'S OwN DEPosiTION-King v. Interna-

At common law depositions were admissible in evidence in ecclesiastical
and equity courts but not in trials at law unless both parties consented. 1
Today, the simple rules of the common law in this area have been entirely
replaced by statutory law 2 and Rules of Court.3 The recent Virginia case
of King v. International Harvester Co. 4 is illustrative of the problems encountered when courts have undertaken judicial interpretation of these codifications.
In King the Virginia Supreme Court gave its first impression of the
recently amended Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court pertaining to the
use by a party of his own deposition. 5 King, the plaintiff, was a non-resident
of Virginia, living in Florida both at the time he filed motion for judgment
for personal injuries and at the time of the trial. During pretrial discovery,
King's deposition was taken, at which time the parties, by counsel, stipulated
that the deposition could be used for any purpose permitted under the Rules
of Court. On the day of the trial King did not personally appear and his
attorney attempted to introduce his deposition in evidence. The trial court
denied the use of the deposition under rule 4:1(d) (3). The Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.
It is well established that under certain circumstances the deposition of a
witness, whether or not a party, may be admitted as evidence in lieu of his
personal appearance.6 In the King case the plaintiff relied on a provision of
1 See O'Neill v. Cooles, 33 Del. 541, 140 A. 648 (1928); Reed v. Allen, 121 Vt.
202, 153 A.2d 74 (1959).
2See Minder v. Georgia, 183 U.S. 559 (1902); McCollum v. Birmingham Post Co.,
'259 Ala. 88, 65 So. 2d 689 (1953); Setliff v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 805, 173 S.E.
517 (1934). See generally 23 AM. JuR. 2d Depositions and Discovery § 3 (1965).

8The following cases interpret rules of their respective courts which have codified
the law regarding the use of depositions as evidence in trials at law. Edwards v. Van
Voorhis, 11 Ariz. App. 216, 463 P.2d 111

(1970); Campbell v. Graham, 144 Colo.

532, 357 P.2d 366 (1960); Fishrnan v. Liberty Assoc., 196 So. 2d 493 (Fla. Ct. App.
App. 2d 289, 227 N.E.2d 376 (1967).
1967); Powers v. Kelley, 83 Ill.
4212 Va. 78, 181 S.E.2d 656 (1971).

5At the time of the King decision, the Rule governing the use of depositions in court
proceedings was designated as VA. Sup. CT.R. 4:1(d) (3).

The subsequent revision of

the Rules effective March 1, 1972 resulted only in a numbering change, and the Rule
can now be found at VA. SuP. CT. R. 4:7 (a) (3). Further references in this note will

be to the old numbering to minimize confusion.
6Depositions have been held admissible when the deponent died pending suit.
Wright Root Beer Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 414 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1969); Derewecld
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 353 F.2d 436 (3rd Cir. 1965); Franzen v. El. DuPont de
Nemours & Co, 146 F.2d 837 (3rd Cir. 1944). When the witness was absent from
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the Virginia Rules of Court which allows such use of a deposition when the
witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the trial, or out of state.
This provision, however, further provides that a deposition of the witness

can not be used if the absence of the witness was procured by the party
affecting the deposition. 7 The Virginia court recognized the proper use
of depositions under certain circumstances, 8 but held that since no excuse
for the absence appeared in the record, King was voluntarily absent and thus
had "procured" his own absence. Accordingly, the deposition was excluded.
The King decision is significant in that its preoccupation with semantics,
particularly as to the meaning of the word "procure," led to a holding
which in effect excludes all party witnesses as a class from the purview
of this section of the rule. 9
Many of the cases in other jurisdictions which have dealt with the use of
depositions under statutes or rules similar to Virginia's rule 4: 1(d) (3) (2)
have neglected to consider the meaning of the qualifying clause. 10 Those that
have considered it have done so only passively and have been reluctant to
find any evidence of procurement." In Weiss v. Weiner12 the federal disthe jurisdiction or beyond the prescribed distance. Perovich v. Glen Falls Ins. Co.,
401 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1968); Williams v. Cox, 355 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1965); Klepal
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 229 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1956). Witness was unable to attend
the trial due to illness. Murray v. United States, 316 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1963); Houser
v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181 (D.C. Md. 1962). See generally 8 Wviucn
& MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2146, 2147 (1970).
7 VA. Sup. CT.R. 4:1 (d) (3) provides in part:

[Tihe deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any
party for any purpose if the court finds: . . .2, that the witness is at a greater
distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of this
State, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the
party offering the deposition....
8 212 Va. at 84, 181 S.E.2d at 660. The use of depositions has also been allowed
under VA. CODE ANN. § 8-313 (Cum. Supp. 1971). For specific cases in which depositions have been allowed in Virginia prior to the adoption of the Rules of Court,
see, e.g., Powell v. Manson, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 177 (1872) (the witness was dead);
Pleasants v. Clements, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 474 (1831) (witness could not be procured);
Douglas v. McChesney, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 109 (1823) (witness was physically unable to
attend).
9 See note 20 infra.
10 Rule 4:1(d) (3) (2) and its counterparts in other states are similar to Rule 32
(a) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Williams v. Cox, 355 F.2d
667 (10th Cir. 1965); Campbell v. Willis, 290 F. 271 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Edwards v.
Van Voorhis, 11 Ariz. App. 216, 463 P.2d 111 (1970); Campbell v. Graham, 144 Colo.
532, 357 P.2d 366 (1960); Hiltibrand v. Brown, 124 Colo. 52, 234 P.2d 618 (1951);
Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109 (D.C. 1966); Fishman v. Liberty Ass'n, 196
So. 2d 493, (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Powers v. Kelley, 83 111. App. 2d 289, 227 N.E.2d
376 (1967); Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 170 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa 1969);
Fleming v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 236 N.C. 568, 73 S.E.2d 544 (1952); Reiniger
v. Piercy, 77 W. Va. 62, 86 S.E. 926 (1915).
" See, e.g., Stewart v. Meyers, 353 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1965). The defendants
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trict court of Maryland held that "procure" refers to a situation in which
a party collusively instigates or induces a witness to remove himself from
the 100 mile area. 13 The Virginia court in King recognized this interpretation but held that if a party is to utilize rule 4:1(d)(3)(2) there must be a
showing that his absence was caused by something more than a mere preference not to attend the trial.' 4 Without such evidence, the absence will be
deemed voluntary and thus procured by the party offering the deposition.
were husband and wife. At the trial the husband stated that he and his wife were
separated and that her last known residence was at a place more than 100 miles
from the trial. The trial court allowed the deposition of the wife. This decision was
upheld on appeal. In the King decision the court referred to this case but simply
stated that the trial court was convinced that the deponent had not procured her
own absence and thus distinguished Stewart from the case at bar. 212 Va. at 83, 181
SE.2d at 660.
In Richmond v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1955) the plaintiff's attorney offered
the deposition of the plaintiff, an out-of-state resident, into evidence. The court
allowed the deposition. The Virginia court also referred to this case, but pointed
out that in reaching its decision the Richmond court concluded that the plaintiff
could not afford the trip to the trial. 212 Va. at 83, 181 SE.2d at 660.
In Weiss v. Weiner, 10 F.R.D. 387 (D. Md. 1950) the defendant was a resident
of Florida while the action was brought in Maryland. The court allowed the defendant's deposition stating that "[rlule 26(d)(3) [similar to Virginia's rule 4:1(d)
(3) (2)] is . . . literally gratified unless the circumstances satisfy the court that the
deponents absence could have been said to have been procured by himself." Id. at
388. The Virginia court in referring to this case pointed out that in Weiss the defendant sought a continuance on the day of the trial and the court concluded that
the defendant was in Florida for his health. 212 Va. at 83, 181 S.E.2d at 660.
In Ross v. Lewin, 83 N.J. Super. 420, 200 A.2d 335 (1964) the plaintiff, a California
attorney, sued the defendant in New Jersey for legal fees. The court allowed the
use of the plaintiff's own deposition stating that "[ilt would be a distortion of the
language of R.R. 4:16-4(c) [similar to Virginia's rule 4:1(d) (3) (2)] to say that a
California resident . . . had procured his absence from New Jersey, merely because
he did not attend personally at the trial in New Jersey." Id. at 336. See also Hideyuki
Kono v. Auer, 51 Hawaii 273, 458 P.2d 661 (1969); Perlin Packing Co. v. Price, 247
Md. 475, 231 A.2d 702 (1967); Aircraft Radio Indus. v. M.V. Palmer, Inc., 45 Wash.
737, 277 P.2d 737 (1954).
But see Vevestad v. Flynn, 230 F.2d 695 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 827

(1956). Defendant, who knew the date of the trial, voluntarily left the United States
and the trial court refused to allow his deposition. The appellate court upheld this

decision stating that the lower court's refusal to consider the deposition may well
have been in accordance with the rule, but that the deposition itself had no bearing
on the ultimate issue. In Jameson v. Tully, 178 Cal. 380, 173 P. 577 (1918) the
deponent had been in attendance up until one hour before her deposition was

offered. The court refused to allow the deposition.
12 10 F.R.D. 387 (D. Md. 1950).
13 Id. at 389. See also Stewart v. Meyers, 353 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1965); Richmond
v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1955); Hyam v. American Export Lines, 213 F.2d
221 (2d Cir. 1954).
14 212 Va. at 82, 181 S.E.2d at 659.
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If one will indulge in further subtleties of rule construction, it may be
argued that the admissibility of a party's deposition turns on the meaning
of the word "absence." The term has been held to refer to absence from
the 100 mile area or absence from the state. 15 Under this interpretation a
party who resides in another state can hardly be said to have procured his
own absence. The King court, on the other hand, concluded that "absence" refers to absence from the courtroom. Moreover, voluntary absence
from the courtroom is enough under the King decision to bring the party
within the meaning of the "unless clause" and preclude the use of his deposition at the trial. It has been suggested that too much has been made of
this distinction; that "procure" as used in the qualifying clause should be
interpreted in the same way regardless of the meaning of "absence." 16
The King court emphasized that since "lIt] here is no intimation in the
record that plaintiff's absence was caused by illness, age, infirmity or for
7
any reason other than his own volition" he procured his own absence.' If
the party's absence had in fact been caused by illness, age, or infirmity
there would be no need to invoke this section of the rule, for provision is
made under another section for such contingencies.' s As to any other ex15 4 A J. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrICE

32.05 (2d ed. 1971):
The crux of the question is whether "absence" . . . means absence from the
territory embraced within a radius of 100 miles from the place of trial or
absence from the trial. If the former meaning is correct, a party who resides
more than 100 miles from the place of trial, as is often the case when jurisdiction
is based on diversity of citizenship, can hardly be said to have procured his
own absence from the territory embraced within a radius of 100 miles from
the place of trial. Under this view a party who resides more than 100 miles
from the place of trial may use his own deposition as evidence at the trial.
If "absence" means absence from the trial, a party who resides more than 100
miles from the place of trial may not use his own deposition as evidence at the
trial unless it appears that he could not be present at the trial and that his
absence is not due merely to a preference to use his deposition rather than to
testify orally at the trial. Id. at 32-29.
In Richmond v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1955) the court considered the
two meanings of "absence" but decided that it referred to absence from the 100
mile area:
[Tihe language used, referring to different stages of trial or hearing, and obviously
pointing back to the defining clause which sets forth the basic reasons for
admissibility, makes it quite clear that the former is meant. Id. at 493.
16See Richmond v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1955); Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (dissenting opinion):
In view of the clear intent and purpose of the rule there would be no particular
reason or sense in substituting a purely arbitrary restriction for the discretionary
finding as to the purpose of the absence, required by the rule itself as a condition
of exclusion. Id. at 478 n.4.
17 212 Va. at 85, 181 S.E.2d at 661.
8
1 VA. Sup. Cr. R. 4:1(d) (3) (3):
[T]he deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any
party for any purpose if the court finds: ... that the witness is unable to attend
or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment....
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cuses which a party may offer for his absence, these could be brought out
under still another section of the same rule which provides for the use of
depositions under exceptional circumstances. 19 Under the King decision
however, an out-of-state litigant must affirmatively provide an excuse for
his absence, and thus in effect is required to qualify under two sections of
the rule. 20 As a result, rule 4:1 (d) (3) (2), standing alone, is unavailable to
21
the party litigants themselves.
It appears that a better solution would be to allow the use of the deposition
of a party when that party does in fact reside more than 100 miles from
the place of trial or out of state. It should be noted that rule 4: 1(d) (3) as
drafted provides that if the opposition feels that a party's attendance would
be in the interest of justice, he may petition the court to require the party's
attendance. 22 This provision obviates the need for the narrow construction
19

VA. Sup. Cr. R. 4:1 (d)(3) (6):

[Tlhe deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any
party for any purpose if the court finds: ... upon application and notice, that
such exceptonal circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of
justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used; but on
motion made before the commencement of the trial, the court may, for good
cause shown, require any such witness to attend in person.
20The rule itself permits the use of a deposition if the deponent is out of state
or at a distance greater than 100 miles from the place of trial. But as a result of
the King court's narrow construction, a deponent party who resides out of state
not only must fulfill this requirement but is further required to offer an excuse
for his absence. Thus he is forced to bring himself within the purview of a second
section of the rule as well (rule 4:1(d) (3)(3) if the deponent is sick or rule 4:1
(d) (3) (6) should exceptional circumstances exist).
21 In reaching its decision the Virginia Court emphasized the importance of oral
testimony of witnesses before the jury, enabling the jury to observe their demeanor,
appearance, candor, and behavior on the witness stand. The court also felt that if
allowed to testify by deposition, the parties might abuse the privilege if it appeared
that their demeanor and appearance might be harmful to their case. While this
may be true in some instances, the tactical burden that is placed upon a party by
his failure to appear would no doubt restrict its use. See Richmond v. Brooks,
227 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1955).
22
VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:1(d) (3)(6). See cases cited note 6 supra. In the King case
the plaintiff was fully examined by both parties when the deposition was taken. At
that time it appeared that the burns which the plaintiff allegedly received as a
result of defendant's negligence would be important to the plaintiff's case. During
the course of his examination the plaintiff also failed to answer several questions.
With these things in mind the defendant easily could have recognized the potential
value of the plaintiff's oral testimony and appearance in open court, and, invoking
rule 4:1(d) (3) (6), could have petitioned the court to require the plaintiff to appear.
In ruling on this petition the court would make its discretionary decision prior to
the trial and the deponent party would be absolutely apprised beforehand of the
necessity for his appearance.
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of rule 4: 1(d) (3) (2) by the court in King. Such an interpretation would
allow the Rules of Court to be enforced in spirit, free of the confusing complexities of over-analysis of terms, and would place no undue burden upon
23
either party.
M.R.E.

23 Under the King decision a discretionary decision must be made as to whether
the party procured his own absence. However, the fact that this decision is not
made until the time of trial may place a burden on the deponent party. Under the
proposed interpretation, the discretionary decision would be made prior to the trial
date, and thus neither party would be placed at a disadvantage.

